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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2807
___________
MIKE PEREZ,
        Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-CV-01944)
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 18, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 22, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Mike Perez brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), claiming
that prison officials at FCI-Schuylkill were negligent when he had an asthma attack while
he was housed in the Segregated Housing Unit of the prison.  The District Court granted
2summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the nightmares cited by
Perez at his deposition did not constitute a “prior showing of physical injury” as required
under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) to claim mental or emotional
damages.  Perez appealed, and we vacated the District Court’s judgment.  
We noted that the District Court did not consider all of the physical injuries Perez
claimed:  
[I]t is unclear why the District Court did not consider whether the
immediate physical effects from the asthma attack itself would have
constituted a “prior showing of physical injury” under the statute, but it did
not.  See Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087 (8th  Cir. 2006) (prisoner’s
allegations and testimony of headaches, cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness
while prison missed prescribed blood pressure screenings sufficient to
overcome § 1997e bar); cf. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342,
1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (physical manifestations of emotional injury do not
qualify as “prior” physical injuries).  In its brief, the United States asserts
that Perez only identified bad dreams as his injuries.  While the United
States is correct that Perez claims only damages for mental or emotional
distress, it is wrong that Perez never identified other physical injuries that
occurred as a result of the alleged asthma attack.  At the deposition, Perez
stated that he was dizzy, weak, nauseous, and had a headache immediately
after the attack, and that he had back pain from coughing for a couple of
days.  (See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment,
attached as Exhibit 1, at p. 53-54.)  Just because Perez is not claiming
damages specifically from those physical injuries does not mean that his
allegations of them cannot be considered as a showing of a physical injury
for the purposes of the statute.  See  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2).  
Perez v. United States, 271 F. App’x 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  We directed the District
Court to consider on remand whether the other physical injuries Perez claimed met the
criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).      
On remand, the District Court again found Perez unable to overcome the physical
3injury requirement of the statutes “because his dizziness, headaches, weakness, back pain,
and nausea, all of which were temporary in nature and did not require medical attention,
are considered de minimis for the purposes of the FTCA’s physical injury requirement.” 
District Court Memorandum 5.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District
Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary.  See Abramson v. William Paterson
College, 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).  We apply the same standard that a district
court must apply in deciding whether summary judgment is merited.  See id.  We view the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that
party’s favor to determine whether there is a genuine issue of any material fact and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id.  
Applying this standard, we cannot conclude, as the District Court did, that the
United States was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Perez suffered only de
minimis physical injuries.  Ultimately, it may be true that Perez’s injuries were like the
“sore, bruised ear lasting for three days” which the court in Siglar v. Hightower classed as
de minimis.  See 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).  Or they could be de minimis injuries
like “swelling, pain, and cramps,” Jarriett v. Wilson, 414 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2005), or
“nose sores [that] were relieved with water and baby oil,” Canell v. Multnomah County,
141 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (D. Or. 2001).  The injuries Perez reported might be like a
“sore muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, a bruise, etc., . . . [like those that]
4people in the regular and ordinary events and activities in their daily lives do not seek
medical care for.”  Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997).    
However, Perez reported that his symptoms, associated with his asthma attack,
were of such a severity that he needed steroids, prescription medicine, and other medical
treatment to recover.  Plaintiff’s Exhibits in Support of his Response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, Ex. 1, Perez Dep. 43, 48, 53-55, 58.  Although the District Court
found that Perez did not require medical treatment to resolve his symptoms, the issue is a
matter of contention between the parties.  Furthermore, in Luong, the court distinguished
those injuries that resolve with home treatment from those injuries that require a visit to
an emergency room or a doctor, assessing the former as de minimis.  See 979 F. Supp. at
486; see also Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th  Cir. 2006) (holding that
allegations and testimony about headaches, cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness related to
missing prescribed blood pressure screenings were sufficient to overcome § 1997e bar). 
We note that a severe asthma attack can be life-threatening like a heart attack, which
courts have held to be more than a de minimis physical injury.  See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d
745, 755 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the Mayo Clinic’s assessment of severe chest
pain and heart attack as life-threatening); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.6
(10th Cir. 2000).  The severity of the attack and the need for medical treatment are
genuine issues of material fact in this case.  It remains in question whether Perez met the
physical injury requirement to support his negligence claim for emotional injuries.  
5In addition to arguing that Perez’s injuries were de minimis, the United States
presses us to affirm the District Court’s judgment because Perez did not present expert
testimony to support his claim that the failure to treat his asthma attack caused his
injuries.  However, we will not take up this issue.  Not only did the United States not raise
the issue in the District Court, see Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 273 F.3d 337, 344 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001), but also, in its brief in support of its
motion for summary judgment, it seemed to argue that expert testimony is not necessary
to resolve this case.  (Specifically, in the District Court, the United States contended that
the law “does not require expert medical testimony - in [sic] case such a [sic] this - if a
matter is so simple or obvious to be within a lay person’s range of experience and
comprehension.” Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 11
(citation omitted).)
In short, because the nature of Perez’s injuries remains unclear in light of the
conflicting submissions of the parties, we conclude that the District Court’s decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of the United States on the basis that Perez’s injuries
were de minimis was in error.  We will vacate the District Court’s judgment.  We remand
this matter to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
